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Recent Traumatic Disease Claims
Henry B. Fischer*
W AT CAUSES A PERSON to become afflicted with a particular
disease? On first impression, one might reply that this is
the sort of question that should be presented to a medical doctor.
However, in personal injury actions, questions of this type are
answered by juries' in their fact-finding capacity. To determine
the question whether a particular trauma, caused a subsequent
diseases. Both of these facets are related to medical advances.
Claimants over the years have alleged a causal relation be-
tween trauma and almost every conceivable disease. Medico-
legal literature abounds with articles concerning the relation be-
tween trauma and the more commonly occurring diseases, such
as cancer,3 diabetes,4 arthritis,' bursitis,6 heart disease,7 multiple
sclerosis,' and epilepsy.9 Numerous books wholly devoted to the
relation of trauma and disease, have been written. 10
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1 20 Am. Jur. 648, § 776; 7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1976 (3rd ed., 1940).
2 20 Am. Jur. 730, § 867; and see, Averbach, Causation; A Medico-Legal
Battlefield, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 209, 214 (1957).
3 3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 127; Adelson, Injury and Cancer, 5 Wes. Res.
L. R. 150 (1954); Heuper, Trauma and Cancer, 1 Trauma (1) 47 (1959);
March, Traumatic Cancer in Workmen's Compensation, 11 Clev.-Mar. L.
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TRAUMATIC DISEASE
This article is primarily concerned with cases wherein an
allegation is made that a single trauma caused a disease. To en-
hance understanding, the immediately following paragraphs are
devoted to some pertinent definitions.
Trauma 12 has been defined as an injury to tissue following
as the direct result of violence in some form, whether the latter
be physical, chemical, or electrical. The discussion to follow is
concerned primarily with the aspects of single mechanical trau-
ma, i.e., stress, strains, impact, and cuts.
Disease is defined as a dynamic state in living organisms in
which normal characteristics of structure or function are al-
tered.13 The healthy body or tissue tends to maintain homeo-
stasis, i.e., a steady state of acceptable physiological activity, by
means of many regulatory mechanisms. When any extrinsic or
intrinsic factor causes an alteration of the body tissue so that the
available homeostatic mechanisms cannot overcome the alter-
ation, disease results. In another sense, disease is the failure of
the body or one of its parts to adapt to change.
On the definitions of trauma and disease, there seems to be
little semantic difficulty between the medical and legal profes-
sions. Assuming the fact of trauma, some difficulty lies in estab-
lishing the connection between trauma and the disease.1
4
However, semantic difficulties between medical and legal
professionals are often present in considering whether or not a
particular trauma caused a particular disease.15 Indeed, the
courtroom has been depicted at times as being a battlefield for
lawyers and doctors. 1 6 Since the practical issue involved in such
litigation is whether or not a defendant should pay for the cost
of treating the disease, examination of these semantic differences
are necessary in this article.
In a legal sense, proximate cause is the nexus between one's
act, the resulting injury and legal liability. More specifically,
legal liability arises when one's wrongful act is the proximate
cause of a claimant's damage. The proximate cause is that event
in a chain of events, without which the damage would not have
12 14 McGraw-Hill Encyc. of Science and Technology 68 (1960).
13 4 Id. 235.
14 Bedenk v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 285 S. W. 2d 609 (Mo., 1955)
(tremor in eyelids and hand).
15 Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause, 31 Tex. L. R. 630 (1953); Aver-
bach, op. cit. supra n. 11.
16 Averbach, op. cit. supra n. 11.
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resulted.17 As applied here, damages may be had in such in-
stances where trauma causes a disease,18 where trauma activates
a dormant disease,19 or where trauma aggravates a pre-existing
disease.20 In the first two examples, damages would include the
cost of curing or treating the disease, whereas in the third situ-
ation, the damages should include only the costs supplemental
to what would have been required to cure or treat the pre-exist-
ing disease.
In a medical sense, the factors which cause any alterations
that have a bearing on disease causation are called etiological
factors.21 Few diseases are caused by a single etiological factor.
22
There are usually multiple factors in the production of a disease
in an individual. There may, however, be one factor which is
constant, which is essential-the sine qua non-sometimes called
the specific cause.23 The latter is best thought of as a primary
etiological factor, whereas other factors that may fit into the
causation of a disease may be thought of as secondary etiological
factors.
A good example24 of a disease wherein primary and second-
ary etiological factors have a bearing is tuberculosis. An indi-
vidual cannot have tuberculosis unless he also has the tubercule
bacilli organisms in his system. Although the presence of tuber-
cule bacilli is necessary for the appearance of tuberculosis symp-
toms, mere presence is sometimes insufficient in itself to cause
such symptoms to appear. In most instances, however, an indi-
vidual suffering from malnutrition and having tubercule bacilli
in his lungs would more than likely suffer from the symptoms
of tuberculosis. Here, the tubercule bacillus may be classified
as a primary etiological factor, whereas malnutrition may be
classified as a secondary etiological factor.
Diseases in the medical sense may be divided into three
categories with respect to the etiological role of trauma. These
are: (1) diseases which are always a result of trauma, i.e., con-
tusions, abrasions, and lacerations, (2) diseases which never
17 Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1957).
18 Ingram v. McCorkle, 121 S. 2d 303 (La. App., 1960).
19 Hazlewood Taxicab Co. v. Hodge, 357 S. W. 2d 711 (Ky. App., 1962).
20 Sentiles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U. S. 107, 110 (1959).
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result from trauma, e.g., measles, and (3) diseases which develop
with or without trauma, viz., where trauma may be a secondary
etiological factor.
25
To evaluate the role of trauma in causing a particular dis-
ease, a physician will likely consider: 26
1. The physical and psychic condition of the patient before
injury,
2. The type, site, and severity of the injury,
3. The immediate effects of the injury (objective and sub-
jective),
4. "Bridging symptoms" (symptoms sandwiched in between
and/or overlapping the injury and disease symptoms),
5. Time interval between injury and appearance of disease
symptoms,
6. Diagnosis of the disease (mode of onset, site of onset,
and course).
Using the above or other criteria in analyzing the role of
trauma on an apparently subsequent disease, a physician might
conclude that: 
27
1. The trauma was a true causative factor (the disease
could not have occurred without the injury).
2. The trauma was a major precipitating factor, (i.e., injury
alone could not have caused the disease-the disease was
already present in the latent form; other etiological fac-
tors can be demonstrated to be partly responsible for the
disorder or can be conclusively shown to be necessary
along with the injury for production of the disease-the
disorder probably would not have appeared at the time
it did without the injury and might never have become
manifest at all without the injury.
3. The trauma was an aggravating factor, i.e., the disease
was manifest prior to the injury, but its clinical course
was materially aggravated or adversely affected by the
injury.
4. The trauma was a minor precipitating factor, i.e., the dis-
ease was already present in a latent form, and would
have become manifest without the trauma. It is prob-
able that the trauma, either through its physical or psy-
chological effects was at least partially responsible for
the outbreak of the disease at the present time.
25 Id. at 3.
26 Id. at 5.
27 Id. at 15.
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5. The trauma had no demonstrable relation to the disorder,
i.e., there was no continuity of the injury, bridging, and
disease symptoms. Knowledge of the pathologic process
of the disease and time when the disease symptoms ap-
peared do not allow the conclusion that such process
began at the time of the injury. It is extremely unlikely
that the injury was in any way connected with the clis-
order.
Even cursory examination of the above concepts of cause
might lead one to the conclusion that both the medical and the
legal professions need to have some understanding of each oth-
er's concepts to allow for effective resolution of personal injury
suits. Obviously, specific background information is necessary
in determining the significance of various symptoms and their
relation to a disease. As mentioned before, whether a disease is
caused by a wrongful trauma is a question within the sole prov-
ince of the jury. The jury must consider the evidence presented
to it and make a finding of fact. The jury is aided in its deter-
mination of cause by testimony of expert witnesses, physicians,
which becomes part of the trial record.
With respect to reversing the jury's determination on ques-
tions of disease causation, it has been said that:
The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of
the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury...
Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside
the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn
different inferences or conclusions or because the judges
feel that other results are more reasonable. 28
Where, however, medical facts become common knowledge,
courts may take judicial notice of them. For example, we find
that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "Doctors grave-
ly discussed whether a woman could be got with child by the
devil, or by a dream, and French judges legitimized an infant,
when the husband had been separated four years from the moth-
er, on the grounds that the child owed its paternity to a
dream!" 29 Today, we find judges taking judicial notice of the
period of gestation.30 Be this as it may, it is not always possible
to have all facts necessary for analysis before doctors or juries
in a form suitable for absolute application of the above listed
28 Sentiles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., supra n. 20.
29 Brahdy, op. cit. supra n. 10 at 13.
30 In re McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, 7 A. L. R. 313 (1919).
May, 1963
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considerations. Likewise, etiological factors of diseases are not
generally of such common knowledge today that judges may
take judicial notice of them, especially where two or more
schools of medical thought exist.
Let us now examine some recent disease complaints and the
relationship or lack of relationship thereto of trauma.
Traumatic Cancer
Claimants have alleged that single impacts to parts of their
bodies, such as: to the breasts,31 the knee,32 and to the shoulder33
have caused cancer. Damages were awarded on such claims even
though medical opinion seemed clear that single trauma is not an
etiological factor of cancer. In this sense, one reviewing court
said: 34
The jury could reasonably (have) found that the (cause of)
cancer is unknown; that the preponderance of medical opin-
ion is to the effect that cancer rarely ever results from a
single trauma; but that the exceptional circumstances sur-
rounding this case, particularly the period that lapsed be-
tween the date of the trauma and the appearance of the
cancer, and the fact that the cancer was located at the pre-
cise point of injury, justified the conclusion that there was a
causal connection between the plaintiff's injury and her
cancer.
In considering trauma as an etiological factor in cancer, physi-
cians rely on statistics from two world wars, clinical histories,
and clinical tests on animals.35 A recent law review article point-
ed out a clinical test wherein mice were subjected to known
etiological cancer factors and then subjected to trauma. More
cancer was reported in the traumatized group than in the con-
trol group.36
31 Lee v. Blessing, 131 Conn. 569, 41 A. 2d 337 (1945); Dennison v. Wing,
279 App. Div. 494, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 811 (1945).
32 Branson v. Fireman's Retirement Fund, 79 Idaho 167, 312 P. 2d 1037
(1957).
33 Trauma Held to be Cause of Cancer, 13 TAPA Bull. (3) 4 (Mar., 1962);
7 Oleck, Neg. & Comp. Serv. No. 17 (1962).
34 Lee v. Blessing, supra n. 31.
35 Hueper, Medicolegal Aspects of Cancer, 25 American Journal of Clinical
Pathology 116 (1955).
36 March, op. cit. supra n. 3.
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Traumatic Tuberculosis
Case One.8 7 A 19-year-old married woman suffered injuries
to her neck, shoulder, and back muscles and tissues from an
auto collision. Prior to the accident, she was allegedly strong and
healthy, did housework, and cared for two children. Immedi-
ately following the accident she was hospitalized for twelve days
and made twenty visits to her doctor over a period of seven
months. Fluoroscopic images of her chest taken one and two
years prior to the accident by the Louisville Tuberculosis Associ-
ation were negative in showing the presence of tuberculosis.
For two months immediately after the accident, fluoroscopic
examinations of her chest taken by her doctor were also nega-
tive. Approximately seven months after the accident, she com-
plained of chest discomfort and coughing and fluoroscopic and
x-ray examinations revealed that she had tuberculosis in both
lungs. At the time of the trial she had spent a year in a sanitori-
um and was still residing there. There was medical testimony to
the effect that the injuries either activated or lighted up a dor-
mant germ or infection or so reduced the plaintiff's resistance as
to cause her to contract the disease. The jury found the trauma
so related, awarded the plaintiff $20,000 accordingly, and its deci-
sion was upheld upon appeal, the court saying that ". . . a negli-
gent actor is liable for a disease which is contracted because of
lowered vitality from injuries, or for a disease activated or light-
ed up by injuries."
Case Two.8  A seaman aboard ship in a heavy sea was
pitched into the air, fell back first on the ship deck, and was
washed a considerable distance by a wave. There was a possi-
bility that he inhaled some sea water. The petitioner was hos-
pitalized and shortly after the accident the active symptoms of
tuberculosis appeared. X-ray pictures taken prior to the acci-
dent revealed a pulmonary lesion involving a "small scarred in-
active area." In "retrospect" the specialist felt that the lesion
had been tubercular. The plaintiff was a diabetic prior to and
after the accident. One doctor said that the accident, "probably
aggravated his condition." In response to a hypothetical ques-
tion as to the effect of an accident like the petitioner's on the
aggravation or activation of a pre-existing, dormant tubercular
87 Hazlewood Taxicab Co. v. Hodge, supra n. 19.
88 Sentiles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., supra n. 28; cf. Jones Act,
46 U. S. C. A. § 688.
May, 1963
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condition, another specialist said that "acute dissemination of
the tuberculosis might" be a consequence of the accident. A
specialist who had treated the petitioner during his post-accident
hospitalization testified to the effect that both the diabetic condi-
tion and the accident were etiological to the aggravation, but
would not commit himself as to which etiological factor more
probably caused it. A verdict for the petitioner was reinstated
by the United States Supreme Court saying:
39
The jury's power to draw the inference that the aggravation
of petitioner's tubercular condition, evident shortly after
the accident, was in fact caused by the accident, was not
impaired by the failure of any medical witness to testify
that it was in fact the cause. Neither can it be impaired by
the lack of medical unanimity as to the respective likeli-
hood of the potential causes of the aggravation existed and
were not conclusively negated by the proofs. The matter
does not turn on the use of a particular form of words by
the physicians in giving their testimony. The members of
the jury, not the medical witnesses, were sworn to make
a legal determination of the question of causation . . . The
very essence of its function is to select from among conflict-
ing inferences and conclusions that which it considered most
reasonable.




Plaintiff, a 37-year-old elevator service man, was subjected
to whiplash (10-m.p.h. differential speed). Just before the acci-
dent plaintiff was suffering from a cold and a sore neck (cause
unknown). His only immediate complaint from the accident was
to the effect that his neck pain had extended from the base of
his skull to his back section in between the shoulder. Other
than that he did not complain and he left the scene of the acci-
dent without filing a police report and resumed his work in serv-
icing elevators.
Four days after the injury the plaintiff's physician examined
him and found that he was suffering from a strain or sprain com-
mon to whiplash injury. He had limited motion of his head, and
the doctor prescribed heat, rest, and massage for the neck ail-
89 Id. at 110.
40 Butler v. Palm, 351 IM. 256, 184 N. E. 2d 633 (1962).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss2/9
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
ment. X-rays taken during a subsequent visit (twenty-two days
from trauma) revealed no fractures, and the plaintiff, still com-
plaining of pain, didn't indicate or exhibit any other unusual
symptoms.
Three months after the injury, the plaintiff, while bowling,
began to feel sick and tired and complained that, "he couldn't
see just right and that everything was blurry like." He went
home, vomited, and, feeling tired and as though he were catch-
ing a cold, went to bed. He was taken to the hospital on the fol-
lowing day and was unconscious for about one and one-half
months--diagnosis, meningoencephalitis and subsequent pneu-
monia.
Seven months after the injury, the plaintiff went home for
a four to five months' rest. He resumed work for about six
weeks, rested for nine months, worked two months; his employ-
ment became quite irregular thereafter and amounted to about
one-third of pre-trauma efforts. At the time of the trial, he was
suffering from thickened speech, a balance problem, difficulty
with vision, and his attitudes and entire personality were altered
as compared to his pre-trauma disposition. This condition was
diagnosed as probably permanent.
Medical testimony at the trial was to the effect that menin-
ges are layers of membranes which cover the brain and spinal
cord, that between these meninges and the surface of the brain
is the spinal fluid, and that meningoencephalitis is an infection
of these membranes and is present not only in the spinal fluid,
but in the substance of the brain itself.
Expert medical testimony was to the effect that,41 "... if
the plaintiff had damage to his brain or his cord from the injury,
then he could get a meningoencephalitis secondary to it," (de-
fendant's objection to this testimony was overruled). As anoth-
er doctor put it, 42 ". . . an accident creates an inflammation,
creates an area of lowered resistance, which is an ample, often
necessary reason, for the development of an infection in an area,
granted that there was a muscle or bone which affected this
region, a matter of nearly three months later."
Two other physicians stated that the incubation period of
meningoencephalitis would be within three days to three weeks
from the injury, that spinal cord injury would cause such symp-
41 Id. 184 N. E. 2d at 637.
42 Ibid.
May, 1963
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toms as lack of muscular control within twenty-four hours after
an injury, and that brain damage would be manifested by such
symptoms as dizziness or headache within twenty-four hours
after the injury.
Upon appeal, the court reversed the jury's decision that the
accident caused the disease, stating that,43 ". . . its conclusions
must be supported by something more than mere speculation,"
and, that the evidence showed no spinal cord or brain damage.




Petitioner, while in the course and scope of his employment
on top of a five-foot stack of oily tubing, slipped and fell upon his
knees. He sensed immediate pain in his back and knees and a
later sensation, "like somebody hit me right up here in the back
with a blunt object." He suffered no bruises.
Prior to the accident, petitioner, a forty-one-year-old male,
did "stock chaser" work and walked as much as twenty miles per
day in gathering materials. Twelve days after the injury the
petitioner ceased working, on a doctor's advice, and was hospital-
ized when the doctor noticed that he was suffering from pain in
the lower back, numbness in the legs, diminished reaction of the
lower extremities, exaggerated knee reflexes, ankle problems,
and loss of abdominal reflexes. A neurosurgeon noted dimin-
ished reaction to pain and pressure in the lower extremities be-
low the groin, absence of abdominal reflexes, involuntary oscilla-
tion of the eyes, and an unsteady gait. Subsequent examination
revealed that the petitioner's spinal fluid contained an abnormal
number of lymphocytes, indicating a lesion in the brain stem.
The diagnosis was to the effect that petitioner was suffering from
multiple sclerosis. The petitioner had a back disorder history
with no indicated abnormalities in the spinal canal.
One physician said that there was no causal relation be-
tween the injury and the disease. Another physician said that
the situation was coincidental. Another (examining) physician
said that the petitioner was suffering from a single traumatic
lesion of the spinal cord which could have resulted from the
43 Id. 184 N. E. 2d at 638.
44 Mechanics' Universal Joint Div. v. Industrial Commission, 34 Ill. 431,
173 N. E. 2d 479 (1961).
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fall; later he changed his diagnosis from traumatic spina lesion
to multiple sclerosis. Still another physician said that trauma
could not cause the disease but could injure the spinal cord to
aggravate a pre-existing condition.
The Industrial Commission found that the injury caused the
disease or aggravated a pre-existing condition, awarding petition-
er $9750 and a $65 per month pension. The reviewing court
affirmed this view even though the testimony was considered
highly conflicting, indicating that the Commission's findings
would be reversed only where the findings were manifestly
against the weight of evidence.
Traumatic Dupuytren's Contracture45
Petitioner, a 42-year-old jail guard, was hurrying up a stair-
way when he tripped, fell forward, and 46
• . . he instinctively extended his arms to break his fall.
His hands traveled some three feet, and all of his 240 pounds,
with the momentum of the fall, came to bear on the ends of
his fingers... (on the edge of a step) ... His hands slipped
from the edge in such fashion that backward bent fingers
formed an obtuse angle as his fingers slipped down the per-
pendicular of the riser and the heels of his palms came to
rest on the stair below.
Petitioner suffered immediate pain, followed by swelling and
discoloration. The jail doctor, who saw him the same day, de-
scribed the condition of the hands as "sprained palmar tendons."
As this condition subsided and disappeared, petitioner developed
a thinning of the palmar fascia with nodular formation, skin con-
traction and restriction in the mobility of the metacarpal
phalange joints of the index, middle, ring and little fingers of
the right hand, and the same type of pathology (but to a lesser
degree) involving primarily the ring finger and the middle finger
of the left hand. -diagnosis, Dupuytren's contracture.
Prior to the injury, the petitioner had been a jail guard for
about four years. Before this, he was employed as a bus driver
and worked 48 hours per week steering fifteen to eighteen ton
busses with no power steering.
One physician with five years general experience was of the
opinion that repeated trauma over a period of time could cause
45 Hall v. Ocean County, 72 N. J. Super. 474, 178 A. 2d 663 (1962).
40 Id. 178 A. 2d at 667.
May, 1963
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the disease, but that a single trauma could not cause it. Another
physician (thirty years of experience with special interest in the
disease) testified to the effect that petitioner's condition was not
related to his fall.
One Dr. Graubard (noted to have studied over 1,000 cases
on the contracture) was of the opinion that petitioner was pre-
disposed to the disease and that the trauma he sustained pro-
duced the Dupuytren's contracture that he examined. He was
of the opinion that the bus driving did not predispose the peti-
tioner to the condition and indicated that he relied upon the,
".. . rapidity of development of this condition in his hands in
which there was evidence of trauma with swelling in the palms
and subsistence of swelling to the formation of nodules." 47
Dr. Graubard also presented a paper 48 he had written on the
etiology of Dupuytren's contracture based on a study of 329
cases. His testimony and paper indicated that people having an
inherent or inherited blood type factor known as Rh prime or
Rh double prime are predisposed to single trauma-induced Du-
puytren's contracture and that this predisposition exists in ap-
proximately six per cent of the white population in the United
States.
The Workmen's Compensation Commission dismissed the
complaint. The Superior Court affirmed the County Court in
overruling the Commission. Apparently impressed with Grau-
bard's testimony and detailed study of the disease, e.g., his paper,
the Superior Court said that ". . . we are satisfied from a con-
sideration of all the evidence that the present condition of his
hands is a result of the sudden, violent insult suffered by his
palms . . . petitioner established his case by a preponderance of
the probabilities, based on believable evidence." 49
Other Traumatic Disease Cases
Coverage of the cases to follow is reduced in scope. These
additional cases are presented to allow a broader view of the
subject of traumatic disease claims. The detail provided in pre-
ceding cases should be sufficient to allow the reader to appreci-
ate the application of the pertinent medical and legal principles
presented at the beginning of the article.
47 Id. 178 A. 2d at 664.
48 Grabard, Dupuytren's Contracture-An Etiologic Study, 21 J. Interna-
tional College of Surgeons, No. 1 (Jan., 1954).
49 Hall v. Ocean County, supra, 178 A. 2d at 667.
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Traumatic Epilepsy"°
A 15-year-old girl was struck by a car and suffered personal
injuries including a deep muscle injury to the right thigh, num-
erous abrasions and contusions, multiple fractures to the pelvis,
a basal skull fracture, a brain concussion and brain injury which
produced epileptic seizures during the initial seventeen days
hospitalization. The injuries were cured without substantial
residual. She was awarded $1,058.55 for medical expenses and
$8,500 for the personal injuries which included future costs for
anti-convulsive medications prescribed by the doctors, based
upon abnormal electroencephalographic findings at time of trial,
to guard against the possibility of a recurrence of epileptic seiz-
ures.
Traumatic Epilepsy 5'
A 6Y2-year-old girl was hit by a bus traveling at 30 m.p.h.
She suffered a small deep wound on the left side of her head
which bled profusely and her lower extremities showed some
bruises and abrasions. Intracranial bleeding continued for 24-48
hours. On the day after the accident she began to vomit, had a
headache, and surgical intervention was necessary to avoid seri-
ous damages due to pressure on the brain. Bony fragments and
hair had to be removed from the skull and a small hole was
made to gain access to the intracranial cavity to allow removal
of a blood clot and normal positioning of the brain against the
skull. A small metal disc was used to cover the opening so as
not to leave the plaintiff with a soft spot on the skull. The disc
was permanent. Her hospitalization lasted eight days and she
remained at home for a month or so before returning to school.
Two years later, an electroencephalogram revealed abnor-
malities that appeared to be major and strongly suggestive of a
focal convulsive disorder arising in the left temporal or inferior
motor area, ". . . possibly with some grand mal component which
may represent spread." The court awarded plaintiff $15,000 and
overruled an objection to a doctor's testimony that: 5 2
I would think that if one considered one hundred people
with a similar abnormality, if that abnormality were the re-
sult of an injury, that probably seventy-five per cent of
those people some time would develop focal epilepsy,
50 Ingram v. McCorkle, supra n. 18.
51 Fort Wayne Transit v. Shomo, 127 Ind. App. 542, 143 N. E. 2d 431 (1957).
52 Id. 143 N. E. 2d at 437.
May, 1963
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and indicated that a medical witness may be asked his opinion
as to the probable results of an injury. Note that no indicated
pretrial seizures were suffered, and that the trial was held two
years after the injury.
Traumatic Heart Failure
53
In an auto collision, a boy suffered a fracture of the left
femur, a head injury, a minor concussion, multiple lacerations of
the right upper orbital region, contusion of the posterior chest
wall, abrasions of the left knee, and a laceration of the left leg.
Several days later surgery was performed in order to properly
set the fractured femur. During the operative procedure the
patient suffered heart failure and died on the following day-
diagnosis, cardiac arrest with fatal brain damage. The auto col-
lision was held to be the proximate cause of death.
Traumatic Ulcers54
Plaintiff, an octogenarian, was injured in a fall while alight-
ing from the defendant's bus. Two months later, a gastric ulcer
was diagnosed. A $13,000 award was held to be not excessive
even though it included the cost of maintaining the plaintiff in
a nursing home after complete recovery from the effects of her
injury.
Traumatic Arthritis 55
The plaintiff, a farmhand, suffered a compound fracture to
his left wrist as the result of an automobile accident. The doctor
who treated him testified that the fracture would be painful for
the first few months, that in later years there would probably
be pain from traumatic arthritis, and that the plaintiff's ability
to perform farm work would be lessened. An award for $5,401.80,
including $118.80 for medical bills was affirmed on appeal.
Conclusions
There are two facets involved in adjudicating traumatic dis-
ease complaints which rely heavily on medical knowledge. These
relate to the etiology or causes of diseases and the diagnoses of
53 Adams v. Dantin, 107 S. 2d 809 (La. App., 1959).
54 Easby v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 402 Pa. 203, 166 A. 2d 494
(1961).
55 Anderson v. Garza, 311 S. W. 2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App., 1958).
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diseases. Both of these facets are related to medical advances.
That is, the role of trauma as an etiological factor in a particular
disease can best be determined when the factual situations of
particular cases are viewed in light of the latest and most con-
vincing etiological evaluations available. Also, assuming that a
causal relation is established between a trauma and a disease,
any damages given must take into consideration the latest meth-
ods for curing or arresting the disease.
It is clear that the role of the physician in the courtroom
must include presentation to the jury of the etiological aspects
of the diseases in question, as well as a diagnosis of the disease,
if the jury is to make a wise decision on the issues of whether a
particular trauma was the proximate cause of the disease in
question and the damages relating thereto. It seems that judges
and lawyers should be possessed of some knowledge of the
aspects of disease etiology if the jury is to be presented with an
accurate view of these aspects and with workable jury instruc-
tions.
The decisions of courts and juries must be based on the evi-
dence and testimony they have before them. Recent publica-
tions56 and seminars57 have been devoted to aiding in the presen-
tation of a complete and accurate picture. The author leaves it
to the reader to evaluate the impact of these aids upon the cases
presented.
56 See Finkle, Trauma and Sexual Impotence, 4 Trauma (2) 60 (1962).
57 See 11 Belli, Trial and Tort Trends 413 (1961), seminar on Electro cardi-
ography.
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